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Abstract 
Economic choices depend on our predictions of the future. 
Yet, at times predictions are not based on all relevant 
information, but instead on the single most likely 
possibility, which is treated as though certainly the case—
that is, digitally. Two sets of studies test whether this 
digitization bias would occur in higher-stakes economic 
contexts. When making predictions about the future asset 
prices, participants ignored conditional probability 
information given relatively unlikely events and relied 
entirely on conditional probabilities given the more likely 
events. This effect was found for both financial aggregates 
and individual stocks, for binary predictions about the 
direction and continuous predictions about expected values, 
and even when the “unlikely” event explicitly had a 
probability as high as 30%; further, it was not moderated 
by investing experience. Implications for behavioral 
finance are discussed. 
Keywords: Judgment & decision-making; probabilistic 
reasoning; explanatory reasoning; behavioral economics. 
Introduction 
Investors aim to buy low and sell high. Alas, this adage 
requires investors to predict the future—a feat known to 
be difficult for mortals (and even for economists). 
People are famously biased in making predictions 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), relying on a variety of 
useful but fallible heuristics. In economic contexts, a 
particularly worrisome bias would be belief digitization, 
as found in some other contexts (Johnson, Merchant, & 
Keil, 2015; Murphy & Ross, 1994). That is, when a 
reasoner is presented with data more consistent with one 
hypothesis than another, the reasoner acts as though the 
higher-probability hypothesis is certainly true when 
making predictions following from the hypothesis. 
For example, in one study (Johnson et al., 2015), 
participants read about a pond that had ecological 
problems explainable either by an infestation of one type 
of snail (a simple explanation), or by an infestation of two 
types simultaneously (a complex explanation). The simple 
explanation was, reasonably, seen as more likely (about a 
66% chance) than the complex explanation (about 34%). 
Yet, when using those explanations to make further 
predictions (e.g., about bacteria proliferation), people 
ignored this uncertainty. Manipulating the probability of 
bacteria proliferation given the simple explanation had a 
large effect on predictions about proliferation, but 
manipulating the probability given the complex 
explanation had no effect at all. People digitized the 
simple explanation, tacitly assigning 100% of their 
probabilistic weight to that possibility. Even though 
people often explicitly quantify uncertainty, this 
uncertainty does not propagate to subsequent 
computations but is instead rounded, in effect, to 0 or 1. 
Such findings pose a challenge to probabilistic theories 
of cognition that treat humans as Bayesian thinkers who 
integrate across possibilities rationally (e.g., Anderson, 
1991). Nonetheless, in many contexts, this strategy may a 
reasonably adaptive way to solve an otherwise intractable 
problem. The inference in this case (from ecological 
problems to snail infestation to the probability of bacteria 
proliferation) involves a fairly short chain of reasoning, 
yet people treated the first step in the inference as certain 
when making the second step. But we often rely on 
lengthy chains of reasoning, and propagating uncertainty 
through the entire chain may well be beyond our 
cognitive limits. If we must limit the complexity of these 
computations by prohibiting the consideration of multiple 
possibilities at each stage (e.g., thinking only about the 
consequences of the one-snail explanation or the two-
snail explanation, but not integrating across both), then it 
is best to focus on the single most likely possibility. A 
person could do worse than this kind of belief digitization, 
even as it leads us astray relative to the optimal answer. 
The current studies test whether such a digitization bias 
would influence judgments in economic contexts. In 
particular, digitization could affect predictions about 
future asset prices. Consider the impact of some piece of 
news, such as information about the government budget. 
Such information often has uncertain implications for 
future valuations, so rational investors would assign 
distributions over these possible futures and value assets 
according to their expected value. If voters elect a 
conservative populist (to take an example that is, of 
course, entirely hypothetical), this introduces uncertainty 
about the probability of fiscal stimulus. Perhaps there is a 
70% probability of stimulus (with one set of implications 
for future valuations) and a 30% probability of fiscal 
austerity (with a different set of implications). Investors 
should rationally incorporate both possibilities into their 
valuations of the market, with a 70% weight on one 
possibility and a 30% weight on the other. Yet, if 
investors digitize, they would treat the likely event as 
certain when predicting the future value of the market. 
Rather than considering both possible futures, they would 
value assets assuming only the single most likely future.  
Although previous studies using non-financial stimuli 
are consistent with this possibility, it is not clear that 
digitization effects would generalize to these contexts. 
First, people are likelier to rely on multiple categories in 
category-based prediction tasks when the categories are 
dangerous or threatening rather than emotionally neutral 
(Zhu & Murphy, 2013). If people adopt a more reflective, 
normative strategy under higher-stakes situations, perhaps 
they also do so when making economically relevant 
predictions. Second, and related, people are sometimes 
more rational when making decisions rather than logically 
equivalent inferences (Johnson, Zhang, & Keil, 2016). 
These two factors could lead people to integrate 
probabilities across potential futures. 
Two sets of studies test whether people nonetheless 
make digitized predictions in economic contexts. 
Experiment 1 provides an initial test, asking participants 
to make probabilistic predictions about the direction of 
asset prices, given uncertain information. Experiment 2A 
tests whether digitization effects would occur only for 
binary predictions (i.e., will a price go up or not?) or 
would instead extend to predictions of expected value on 
a continuous scale. Finally, Experiment 2B tests a 
possible boundary condition by giving participants 
explicit posterior probabilities for the market’s future 
direction. After examining these studies individually, we 
pool the data to examine whether expertise can combat 
digitization biases. In the General Discussion, we assess 
the implications of these findings for behavioral finance. 
Experiment 1 
Participants in Experiment 1 made predictions about 
the future prices of financial assets in light of information 
with uncertain implications. Experiment 1A looked at 
predictions about market aggregates (e.g., the S&P 500) 
and Experiment 1B looked at predictions about individual 
stocks (e.g., GE). Given that individual stocks seem to be 
priced more efficiently than the market as a whole (see 
Shiller, 2005), perhaps digitization mechanisms do not 
apply as robustly to predictions about individual stocks. 
Participants predicted the probability of an increase in 
an asset price, denoted as P(Z), based on information 
about two mutually exclusive possibilities, A and B. For 
instance, A might represent a stimulatory fiscal policy and 
B an austere fiscal policy. Participants were given 
information implying that P(A) > P(B) > 0, so that both A 
and B are possible even as A is likelier—the government 
may not have made a decision on its fiscal policy, but a 
stimulus is probable. In addition, participants were given 
information about the probability of Z conditional on A 
and B—P(Z|A) and P(Z|B). If people take both more and 
less likely possibilities into account, then they should rely 
on both P(Z|A) and P(Z|B) when predicting P(Z). In 
contrast, if people digitize, relying only on the single most 
likely possibility, then only manipulations of P(Z|A) 
should propagate to predictions of P(Z).  
Methods 
We recruited 200 participants from Mechanical Turk, 
divided between Experiments 1A and 1B. 
Participants each completed three items. For each item, 
participants read about an uncertain event, where one 
possibility (A) seemed more likely than the other (B), 
given the available information. These likely and unlikely 
possibilities differed in their implications for future prices 
of financial assets. In the high/low condition, the more 
likely event A would have a high chance of leading to an 
increase in asset values (i.e., P(Z|A) is high), whereas the 
less likely event B would have a low chance of leading to 
an increase (i.e., P(Z|B) is low). One item in the high/low 
condition of Experiment 1A read: 
 
Imagine that a foreign government is deciding what level of 
spending to adopt in the next fiscal year. 
 
If they increase public spending, the value of the US stock 
market is likely to go up. 
 
If they decrease public spending, the value of the US stock 
market is unlikely to go up. 
 
Suppose that the leader of this government is concerned about 
the distribution of wealth in the country and is considering 
increasing public spending. 
  
Participants reading this information should conclude that 
possibility A (public spending increase) was likelier than 
possibility B (public spending decrease). For instance, an 
investor might assign an 80% probability to possibility A 
and a 20% probability to possibility B. 
Whereas P(Z|A) was high and P(Z|B) was low in the 
high/low condition, both P(Z|A) and P(Z|B) were low in 
low/low condition: 
 
If they increase public spending, the value of the US stock 
market is unlikely to go up. 
 
If they decrease public spending, the value of the US stock 
market is unlikely to go up. 
  
Rationally, the probability of a price increase is lower in 
the low/low than the high/low condition, since possibility 
A has positive (indeed, high) probability of being correct. 
Thus, both rational and digitizing investors would 
distinguish between the low/low and high/low conditions. 
A third condition, however, generates different 
predictions for these two groups of investors. In this 
low/high condition, P(Z|A) is low and P(Z|B) is high:  
 
If they increase public spending, the value of the US stock 
market is unlikely to go up. 
 
If they decrease public spending, the value of the US stock 
market is likely to go up. 
  
In this low/high condition, a rational investor would judge 
the probability of a price increase likelier than in the 
low/low condition, since possibility B has positive 
probability (albeit lower than A). In contrast, if people 
digitize, tacitly assigning 0% weight to B, then the 
low/high and low/low conditions would not differ. 
After reading each item, participants rated P(A) and 
P(B) (e.g., “Government intends to increase public 
spending” and “Government intends to decrease public 
spending”) on a 0 to 100 scale. This measure was taken to 
ensure that people did not explicitly place a 0% weight on 
B, in which case rational prediction and digitization do 
not diverge in their predictions. Further, explicitly 
quantifying uncertainty in the task produces a task 
demand to incorporate this uncertainty into predictions, 
working against our hypothesis. 
Finally, on the same page, participants predicted P(Z) 
(“What do you think is the probability that the US stock 
market will go up?”) on the same scale used above. 
Experiments 1A and 1B differed only in the asset being 
judged. In Experiment 1A, the asset was the overall value 
of the US stock market and in Experiment 1B, the asset 
was the share price for stock in specific corporations. 
The three probability conditions were counterbalanced 
with three different vignettes (one on fiscal policy, one on 
monetary policy, and one on regulatory policy) using a 
Latin square. The items were presented in a random order.  
After the main task, participants completed 10 check 
questions and were excluded from analysis if they 
answered more than one-third incorrectly (N = 19). 
Another 14 participants were excluded because their total 
probability ratings for at least one item were not between 
80% and 120%. However, including these two types of 
participants does not alter the pattern of results. Finally, 
49 participants were excluded because they did not rate 
the A more likely than B for at least one of the items, 
since our predictions are predicated on participants’ belief 
that P(A) > P(B). (See Experiment 2B for a version that 
did not require the latter two categories of exclusions.) 
 
Table 1: Results of Experiment 1 
 
Condition Predicted P(Z) 
P(Z|A) P(Z|B) Exp. 1A Exp. 1B 
Low Low 28.8 (28.7) 30.1 (27.4) 
High Low 73.0 (17.7) 75.6 (12.8) 
Low High 30.3 (26.5) 32.3 (26.0) 
Note. Entries are probabilistic predictions, expressed as 
percentages. SDs in parentheses. 
Results and Discussion 
As shown in Table 1, participants digitized in both 
Experiments 1A and 1B. 
In both experiments, participants relied on P(Z|A) for in 
their predictions of future asset prices. The high/low and 
low/low conditions differed only in P(Z|A), and these 
conditions differed sharply in predictions [t(62) = 10.38, p 
< .001, d = 1.85 and t(54) = 10.98, p < .001, d = 2.13 for 
Experiments 1A and 1B]. Thus, people take account of 
high-probability possibilities when making predictions—
consistent with both rational and digitizing strategies. 
These two strategies differ, however, in their 
predictions about the low/high condition. This condition 
differs from the low/low condition only in P(Z|B). Thus, if 
people take account of less likely possibilities, they 
should differentiate between these two conditions, but if 
they digitize, these conditions should be rated similarly. 
Supporting the latter possibility, there was no difference 
between these conditions for either experiment [t(62) = 
0.50, p = .62, d = 0.06 and t(54) = 0.47, p = .64, d = 0.08, 
respectively]. Since we predicted null effects for these 
comparisons, we also computed Bayes Factors (Rouder et 
al., 2009; scale factor 1), which strongly favored the null 
hypothesis [BF01 = 8.9 and 8.5, respectively]. Further, 
based on participants’ other judgments, we can calculate 
the normative mean difference between the low/high and 
low/low conditions (which would produce Ms = 37.6 and 
40.3 for low/high, respectively). In both cases, the actual 
differences were less than these benchmarks [t(62) = 2.41, 
p = .019, d = 0.30 and t(57) = 1.73, p = .089, d = 0.23]. 
Together, these results show that people fail to account 
for low-probability possibilities when making economic 
predictions. This was true both when predicting the 
overall level of financial aggregates as well as the value 
of stock shares in individual companies. 
That said, one may raise some concerns about these 
results. Perhaps of most concern, the information given in 
the problem could plausibly have implied near-certainty 
in its predictions (e.g., “the leader of this government is 
concerned about the distribution of wealth in the country 
and is considering increasing public spending”). To assess 
this possibility, we looked at participants’ explicit 
judgments about P(A) and P(B). Unlike their implicit 
judgments, which assigned essentially a 100% probability 
to A, participants assigned more reasonable probabilities 
when asked explicitly (83% and 82% in Experiments 1A 
and 1B, respectively). Nonetheless, we address this 
concern head-on in Experiment 2B. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 examines two possible boundary conditions 
on belief digitization in economic contexts.  
First, Experiment 1 asked for predictions about the 
probability of binary events (increases or decreases in 
value). The direction of future gains or losses is likely to 
be the dominant factor in real investing decisions, but the 
extent of these predicted gains or losses is also important. 
In some cases, people are better at reasoning about 
continuous rather than binary events (e.g., in covariation-
based causal reasoning; Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984). 
Experiment 2 therefore tests whether digitization effects 
extend to continuous judgments of expected value. 
Second, participants in Experiment 1 arrived at 
estimates of P(A) and P(B) on the basis of other, 
ambiguous information, as has been the case in most prior 
work finding digitization effects (Johnson et al., 2015; 
Murphy & Ross, 1994). Would such effects occur even 
when the problem explicitly quantifies the uncertainty? 
Experiment 2B addresses this question by assigning a 
30% probability to the less likely event. This further rules 
out the concern that participants may have rationally 
ignored a low probability. This also addresses the concern 
that participants in Experiment 1 may have actually 
assigned extremely low explicit probabilities to the 
unlikely events and reported biased explicit judgments 
due to task demands. In that case, it would not be their 
implicit judgments that are biased (for interesting reasons) 
but their explicit judgments (for deflationary reasons). 
Methods 
We recruited 200 participants from Mechanical Turk, 
divided between Experiments 2A and 2B. 
The procedure of Experiment 2A was identical to 
Experiment 1A, except that the dependent measure was a 
continuous price, on either the NASDAQ, DJIA, or S&P 
500, instead of the probability of a directional change. 
Participants were given approximately the current value 
of one of these indices (e.g., “Suppose the current value 
of the United States stock market, as indexed by the S&P 
500, is $2,000”) and then asked to predict the future value 
of that index (“Please estimate what you think the value 
of the S&P 500 will be 3 months from today”) on a scale 
ranging from 10% lower than its current value (e.g., 
$1800) to 10% higher than its current value (e.g., $2200). 
Experiment 2B was identical, except explicit 
probabilities were given for A and B (“Analysts say there 
is a 70% chance that this foreign government will 
increase public spending, and a 30% chance that it will 
decrease public spending”) and thus participants were not 
asked to rate the probabilities of these events. 
After the main task, participants completed 10 check 
questions and were excluded from analysis if they 
answered more than one-third incorrectly (N = 14). 
Another 7 participants from Experiment 2A were 
excluded because their total probability ratings for at least 
one item were not between 80% and 120%. Finally, 31 
participants from Experiment 2A were excluded because 
they did not rate P(A) higher than P(B) for at least one of 
the items. Since Experiment 2B explicitly provided these 
probabilities, participants were not excluded for this 
reason. Analyses including all participants found similar 
results for both experiments. 
 
Table 2: Results of Experiment 2 
 
Condition Predicted Change 
P(Z|A) P(Z|B) Exp. 2A Exp. 2B 
Low Low –0.21% 
(2.96%) 
0.33% 
(3.44%) 
High Low 2.86% 
(3.50%) 
3.57% 
(2.89%) 
Low High –0.32% 
(3.18%) 
0.37% 
(3.54%) 
Note. Entries are predicted changes in stock market value. SDs 
in parentheses. 
Results and Discussion 
As shown in Table 2, participants once again digitized. 
In Experiment 2A, participants predicted a significantly 
higher change in asset price in the high/low condition than 
in the low/low condition [t(56) = 6.59, p < .001, d = 0.95]. 
Thus, participants did consider the likely event when 
making predictions. However, participants again ignored 
the less-likely event B, since they did not use P(Z|B). 
Predicted changes did not differ across the low/high and 
low/low conditions [t(56) = –0.23, p = .82, d = –0.04, 
BF01 = 9.4]. Further, as in Experiment 1, the difference in 
predicted changes between the low/high and low/low 
conditions was marginally lower than it normatively 
should have been (for a low/high mean of 0.59%), based 
on the other judgments [t(56) = 1.93, p = .059, d = 0.26]. 
Thus, digitization occurs even for predictions made on a 
continuous scale rather than probabilities of binary events. 
Experiment 2B provided explicit probabilities of P(A) 
and P(B), ensuring that the “unlikely” event B had a rather 
serious chance of occurring (30%). Nonetheless, the 
results are similar to Experiment 2A. While participants 
again differentiated between the high/low and low/low 
conditions [t(90) = 7.06, p < .001, d = 1.02], they did not 
differentiate between the low/high and low/low conditions 
[t(90) = 0.08, p = .93, d = 0.01, BF01 = 12.0]. Further, the 
difference between conditions was dramatically lower 
than it normatively should have been (for a low/high 
mean of 1.75%) [t(90) = 3.41, p < .001, d = 0.36]. Thus, 
people are willing to ignore even a 30% probability of an 
event’s occurrence when predicting assets’ future value. 
One possible objection is that participants may have 
been giving an appropriate answer, depending on their 
interpretation of the question. That is, whereas 
participants’ judgments of probabilities in Experiment 1 
normatively should accommodate the possibility of lower-
probability events (as is provable from the laws of 
probability), predictions of future value may be reports of 
the most likely single value, rather than the expected 
value. In fact, the single most likely value of the market 
does depend greatly on P(Z|A), given that A is the single 
most likely event, but to a much lesser degree on P(Z|B). 
However, there are two reasons to doubt this 
interpretation. First, although the maximum-probability 
and expected value interpretations of the question are both 
reasonable, participants would have to uniformly adopt 
the maximum-probability interpretation to produce our 
results. That is, if half of participants took the maximum-
probability interpretation and therefore did not use P(Z|B) 
in their predictions, the other half of participants were still 
making a mistake in failing to use P(Z|B). 
Second, even though ignoring P(Z|B) is appropriate in 
estimating the maximum-probability value of the price, 
people tend to probability-match rather than maximize in 
tasks of this sort. For example, suppose there is one 
button that has a 70% chance of giving a positive payoff 
and another button that has a 30% chance of giving the 
payoff. If you are supposed to predict which button will 
produce the payoff on a given trial, the rational thing to 
do would be to choose the 70% button every time. In fact, 
people will predict the 30% button a significant fraction 
(roughly 30%) of the time. The only way to reconcile this 
result with the current task is to assume that participants 
have tacitly assumed that the 30% probability event has a 
0% chance of occurrence and can thus be safely ignored. 
Overall, Experiment 2 helps to address alternative 
interpretations of Experiment 1, and shows that people do 
not need to arrive at estimates of event probabilities 
themselves in order to digitize them. Together, these two 
experiments demonstrate that digitization effects may be a 
pervasive force in investors’ judgments of future value. 
Expertise Effects 
Amateur investors are often referred to as “noise traders” 
in financial models (Shleifer & Summers, 1990) and the 
behavior of these models depends greatly on these 
traders’ beliefs and choices (Shleifer, 2000). Although 
professional investors may use different strategies from 
amateurs (but see Tuckett, 2011), the behavior of 
amateurs contributes to market dynamics and is therefore 
important to characterize. Given that our participants are 
laypeople, but some have investing experience whereas 
others do not (about half of Mechanical Turk participants 
own financial assets and about half have taken at least one 
finance course; Johnson & Tuckett, 2017), would we see 
expertise effects within this sample? 
Participants in both studies were asked to rate their 
investing experience and knowledge. If people who have 
more domain expertise are likelier to consider low-
probability events in making predictions, then the effect 
of P(Z|B)—converted to a z-score to aggregate data across 
studies—ought to be larger for individuals with more 
experience and knowledge. This was not the case, either 
for self-reported experience [r(264) = .02, p = .72] or for 
knowledge [r(264) = –.02, p = .70]. 
This result, although preliminary, suggests that domain 
expertise may not be sufficient to overcome digitization 
effects even in a context like financial prediction that has 
obvious real-world implications. This does not necessarily 
undermine the argument often advanced by economists 
that highly incentivized individuals can avoid such biases, 
nor the possibility that in market contexts corrective 
forces can emerge if a subset of investors exploit the 
suboptimal behavior of others. Nonetheless, this result 
does suggest that quite extensive expertise—outside the 
range of experience of our sample—is necessary for such 
mechanisms to apply. Digitization appears to be a robust 
cognitive bias at the individual level, and is therefore 
likely to cause suboptimal performance from investors at 
a variety of skill levels unless explicitly checked. 
General Discussion 
Economic choices, such as investment allocations, depend 
on our predictions about the future. Rational predictions 
require us to integrate over multiple uncertain 
possibilities; failing to do so leads to overconfident 
predictions that are too near to 0% or 100%. Yet, 
participants in our studies consistently failed to account 
for lower-probability possibilities in making predictions. 
Digitization is broadly consistent with conviction 
narrative theory (e.g., Tuckett, 2011), the idea that 
decisions in highly uncertain environments are made by 
constructing a narrative to explain the past, projecting this 
narrative into the future, and using emotional reactions to 
the projected narratives to guide choices. For example, 
amateur investors use company performance news to 
guide predictions and choices even once the market has 
had time to “price in” that information, particularly if the 
news concerns the future rather than the past (Johnson & 
Tuckett, 2017). This follows from narrative thinking, 
since narratives are emotionally valenced and temporally 
oriented. Another important feature of narrative thinking 
is that it is linear—it concerns a single sequence of events 
rather than a web of possibilities. The current work shows 
that people indeed focus on a single narrative to explain 
the past and project the future, rather than integrating 
across multiple possible narratives.  
In addition to this theoretical contribution, these results 
have two kinds of practical implications. First, these 
biases may persist at the market level, leading to 
mispricing. A previous study examined explanatory 
biases in the context of Wall Street Journal headlines 
(Johnson, 2016). For instance, one headline read “ECB 
Move Crushes Hopeful Markets.” There had recently 
been a downturn in European markets because the 
European Central Bank (ECB) had chosen to follow a less 
inflationary monetary policy than markets had expected. 
Had investors been “counting on” monetary expansion, 
tacitly assigning it a 100% probability? Or had the market 
priced in this uncertainty already (as mainstream financial 
theory suggests; e.g., Malkiel & Fama, 1970)?  
Investors made an uncertain diagnosis (the meaning of 
the ECB chair’s statements) and a prediction based on 
that diagnosis (the implications for monetary policy). 
Normatively, uncertainty about the interpretation of ECB 
statements should propagate to any predictions based on 
such inferences. If the market digitizes at an aggregate 
level, however, this could have led the market to react 
strongly to disconfirmed expectations: If the expectations 
are formed based on uncertain information treated as 
certain, the market would be overconfident. This could 
lead prices to be either too high or too low—and indeed to 
oscillate between those extremes. New information may 
cause an investor to rationally move from predicting, say, 
a 70% probability to a 30% probability of some event. If 
these probabilities are treated as 100% and 0%, 
respectively, this will lead to a much larger shift in asset 
valuation than is justified by fundamentals. 
That said, such an interpretation of these experimental 
results is controversial, as are many efforts in behavioral 
finance to generalize from individual behavior to market-
level behavior (Shleifer, 2000). A common rejoinder from 
a neoclassical approach is that behavioral biases can often 
be neutralized in market contexts. Markets create 
incentives for accuracy, which are often lacking in 
behavioral experiments. Markets allow for specialization 
so that investors can learn over time to correct their biases 
(though our expertise analysis suggests that such learning 
is non-trivial). And perhaps most importantly, self-
correcting market-level phenomena may emerge. If some, 
potentially small, subset of investors comes to understand 
the biases of other investors, they can trade against that 
bias and capitalize on others’ irrationality. Because of 
these mechanisms, market prices may be less likely to be 
seriously afflicted by digitization biases than are 
individual investors’ decisions. However, given that  
stock markets appear to be more volatile than is justified 
by fundamentals (de Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Shiller, 
1981), digitization of hypotheses could be a partial 
explanation of this excess volatility. Nonetheless, this 
issue will not be adjudicated by lab experiments alone. 
Second, however, these biases are troubling not only 
because of potential market inefficiencies they might 
cause. Even if financial markets do have self-correcting 
forces that lead experienced investors to profit from the 
errors of novice investors, the losses of these novices are 
still cause for concern. Digitized predictions of asset 
prices can lead to several errors in the investing strategies 
of amateur “noise traders.” First, if one has a high 
valuation of an asset relative to the market, one may 
overpay for that asset. For instance, if one is purchasing a 
house and has an unreasonably high valuation of that 
house, the buyer may not adequately negotiate the price. 
Second, extreme asset valuations may potentially lead to 
suboptimal patterns of diversification. A very bullish 
assessment of the tech industry accompanied by a very 
bearish assessment of the financial sector may lead one to 
prioritize the former over the latter, when a diversified 
investor would spread her exposure over all sectors. 
Third, if one’s valuations are oscillating faster than the 
market’s valuations, this may lead investors to overtrade, 
which leads to portfolio value loss due to transaction 
costs. Finally, overconfident predictions about asset prices 
may lead investors to inadequately hedge: If the cost of 
insurance is high relative to the perception of the risk 
being insured, there is less incentive to insure. This may 
lead some investors to be overexposed to unexpected 
downturns in the market—why hedge against something 
that is deemed, at some level, to be impossible? 
Nassim Taleb (2010) warns of “black swans”—
“unknown unknowns” of high impact that we discount on 
the basis of their low probability. Our participants 
exemplified this problem, and indeed took it one step 
further: An event with a 30% chance is not exactly on the 
tail of a distribution. Investors would do well to consider 
all the swans—both black and white. 
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